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Abstract
We argue that a restriction determined by a drawn card or quantum ran-
dom numbers, on the running of LHC (Large Hadron Collider), which was
proposed in earlier articles by us, can only result in an, at first, apparent suc-
cess whatever the outcome. This previous work was concerned with looking
for backward causation and / or influence from the future, which, in our pre-
vious model, was assumed to have the effect of arranging bad luck for large
Higgs producing machines, such as LHC and the never finished SSC (Super-
conducting Super Collider) stopped by Congress because of such bad luck, so
as not to allow them to work.
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1 Introduction
In the previous articles [1] we proposed that one should use the LHC-machine to
look for backward causation effects. Indeed, we proposed a model [1, 2, 3, 4] in which
the realized history of the universe was selected so as to minimize a certain functional
of the history, a functional being the imaginary part of the action SI [history], which
only exists in our model. In general, it is assumed in science that there is no pre-
arrangement [5] of initial conditions so as to make special events occur or not occur
later. However J. Bell proposed BBC as a solution to the problems of Einstein
- Podlosky - Rosen’s “super-determinism” [6]. Also, one of the present authors
(H.B.N.) and his group earlier proposed models nonlocal in time (and space) [7, 8, 9].
Similar backward causation effects have also been proposed in connection with the
story that e. g. humanity would cause a new vacuum to appear, “vacuum bomb,” by
one of the present authors (H.B.N.) and collaborators [10]. Our proposal is to test if
there should perhaps be such pre-arrangements in nature, that is, pre-arrangements
that prevent Higgs particle producing machines, such as LHC and SSC, from being
functional. Our model with an imaginary part of the action [1, 11] begins with a
series of not completely convincing, but still suggestive, assumptions that lead to
the prediction that large Higgs producing machines should turn out not to work in
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that history of the universe, which is actually being realized.
The plan behind the practical experiment, which we proposed, was to produce
some random numbers–partly by drawing cards and partly by quantum random
number generation – and then let these random numbers be translated, according
to the rules of the game, into some restrictions on the luminosity or the energy or
both of the LHC. Thus LHC might, for instance, only be allowed to run up to a
certain beam energy. I. Stewart [11] proposed that pauses are determined by random
numbers.
The idea is merely to require any restriction at all for LHC with probability p
that is deemed, by the rules of the game, to be very small. The probability p for a
“close LHC” card is p ∼ 10−6 or so.
It is clear that even a small probability restriction being enforced on LHC, its
luminosity or beam energy, means an artificially imposed – one would say, ignoring
our type of model, unnecessary – risk for the LHC project.
It is, however, the main focus of the present letter to point out (as was briefly
started in the previous article [1]) that even though our proposed project of restrict-
ing LHC according to random numbers seems to give rise to a loss, in fact, whatever
happens seems – initially at least – to be a gain, a success!
That a success in this sense is guaranteed to be the result seemingly with almost
100% certainty (but in reality not quite 100%) is demonstrated in the present article.
2 Card game for LHC restrictions can only be a
success!
There are two possibilities.
1) You draw a card combination of the most common type leading to no re-
strictions. Then LHC can run without any restriction and you can be totally
happy because you found, with close to zero expense, an argument against our
theory. You almost kill our theory, or at least drastically diminish the chance
that it is right. This is a very good scenario!
2) You draw a restriction card combination. Now, it is a significant loss that
LHC cannot run in full, but now you have proved our, or a similar, backward
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causation theory. This would be so interesting, if one really had backward
causation, that it might be counted as a discovery greater than supersymmetric
partners or the finding of the Higgs. It would be a fantastic discovery made
with LHC! If the restriction drawn is not a totally closing, you would likely
soon also find the Higgs and perhaps the supersymmetric partners even if
statistics might initially be a bit worse than hoped for.
It would be a wonderful victory for CERN and LHC to find backward causation
together with having to obey the most likely very mild restrictions. We should
remember that the rule of our card game should be to make the milder restriction
have a much higher chance of being drawn than the very strong restriction of, for
example, totally closing LHC.
Quite correctly, there is, though little chance of, a true loss even though it will not
be initially noticed. It is possible, although not likely, that a random number game
leads to a restriction even if our model, and any model with backward causation,
is wrong. In this case, we have a bad bargain: not only would we loose the full
applicability of LHC, but we would also have gotten, by a statistical fluctuation,
the wrong impression that a backward causation containing model were indeed true
without this actually being the case.
We should certainly arrange the restriction probability p to be low enough to
make this bad case have a very low probability.
One would, from this way of arguing, initially suspect that it would be most
profitable not to perform our random number LHC restricting experiment because
if our theory were right LHC would, in any case, be closed or restricted somehow
by prearranged bad luck, as happened to SSC, for which Congress in the U.S.A.
terminated economic support. Now, however, we want to argue that it would be
more agreeable to have LHC be stopped or restricted by a random number game
rather than by some bad luck such as political withdrawal of support. The main
reason for the artificially caused random number withdrawal being preferred is that
we would, in this case, get more solid support for our, or a similar, model being true
than by the same restriction coming about through a bad luck accident.
To see that would be more convincingly shown the truth of our theory of imagi-
nary action determined by history if we have a card or random number closure rather
than a “normal” failure, we could contemplate how much more convincing our the-
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ory would have been today if the SSC-machine had been closed after a random
number experiment rather than mainly for economical reasons or perhaps because
of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which made the competition with 60 million
dollar accelerators not worthwhile.
Now it is sometimes explained that SSC [12] had bad luck because of various
stupidities or accidents, but had it been a card game nobody could come up with
such foolish cards. Everything is an accident, but we would know the probabilities
very reliably. So if the card game were set up so that the closing probability were
sufficiently small, we would have been sure that the closing of SSC were due to a
(anti)miracle.
In the following, we shall present a little calculational example to illustrate for-
mally that a more reliable knowledge of the truth of our theory is obtained with a
random number experiment. This comes under the discussion of point 2) among the
reasons for conducting our proposed experiment later in the present article.
3 Reasons for conducting our proposed experi-
ment
What could be a reason to conduct the card game experiment?
1) To obtain greater conviction about the truth of our theory
– if it is true of course. –
2) To perhaps avoid bad backward causation effects.
These are the two benefits you could have.
In formula it would mean that we should estimate averages for the two measures
of these two benefits.
3.1-a More conviction of truth of our model
For reason 1) – the conviction about our theory that it is indeed right – we need
some measure. Both the result of the card game and the failure of the LHC for
other reasons are statistical events, but, while we have very trustable ideas about
what probability p to assign to a given class of card combinations, our assignment of
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a trustable value for the failure probability f for other reasons is very difficult and
has a huge uncertainly. Therefore, if LHC fails for a reason other than a random
number game, we would have not even truly learned that our theory was right even
though we would say “it is remarkable that the present authors wrote about the
failure while LHC still looked to be able to work.”
3.1-b Miraculocity and estimating evidence for our model
In order to understand why the difference between getting our model supported
by a “natural ” failure of LHC and a failure caused merely by having a card game
drawing a “restrict LHC” card gives rise to an important difference in trustability
in our model. We shall give a slight formal illustration using the statistical model
which is not very exact but is appropriate for illustrating our point.
If, in our model, a seemingly other reason failure of LHC occurs merely through
the coincidence of a series of small bad luck events – that by themselves can easily
happen – then the number and unlikeliness of elements in this series of bad luck
events must be proportional to −ln f = |ln f | where f is the probability of failure.
We could call this quantity −ln f the “miraculocity” for failure in a seemingly
natural way. This concept of “miraculocity” becomes a measure for how many
“submiracles” must occur. As examples of submiracles, there are “the watch man
having drunk a bit too much”, “the connection between super conducting cables
having too high resistance”, “The accident being in the difficult part of the tunnel,
just under Jura mountain” etc.
Now if we set up a card or quantum mechanically based random number gen-
erator leading to “restrict LHC” with probability p , it needs to generate – by the
selection of the realized history in our model – a number of adjusted accidents (or
submiracles) in a number proportional to −ln p = |ln p| . Essentially, in the case of
the truth of our theory, whether the failure of the LHC will arise via the card or the
quantum random number game or via a natural reason will depend on which of the
two alternative miraculocities −ln p or −ln f is the smallest. There will, of course,
be a preference with “miraculocity”: the least miraculous of the two alternative
possibilities for failure will most likely be the one that occurs. This would require
fewest submiracles.
We can define f so that indeed −ln f gives a measure of the “miraculocity”,
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but it is very difficult even for people building the LHC, to convincingly figure out
what to accept or predict about this miraculocity −ln f = |ln f | . At best, one can
predict it with an appreciable uncertainty. That is to say, we obtain, at least from
some simulation – say by Monte Carlo methods or just theoretically – a probability
distribution for “miraculocity” |ln f |. To illustrate our point of estimating the degree
of conviction, which we shall obtain in the case of a “natural” and / or “normal”
failure, we can assume that the probability calculation – by (computer) simulation
of the political and technical procedures around CERN and LHC – led to a Gaussian
distribution for the miraculocity −ln f . That is to say, we assume the probability
distribution
P (|ln f |) d |ln f | =
≈ 1
σ
√
2pi
exp
( 1
2σ2
(|ln f | − |ln f0|)2
)
d |ln f |.
(1)
Here, σ is the spread of the distribution for the logarithm of f , i.e., the “miracu-
locity.”
Now let us consider the degree of remarkableness for the failure depending on
whether it is due to the card or the quantum random number game or a “normal”
failure, i.e., other reasons such as meteors and bad electrical connection between the
superconductors.
In the case of a card or quantum random number game, the number of sub-
miracles in the card or quantum packing is proportional to −ln p, where p is the
arranged probability by the game rules.
However, if there is instead a “normal” failure due to the stupidity of some
members of cabinet or the like, then we would tend, of course, to believe that the
true miraculocity −ln f = |ln f | for that failure is indeed in the low end of the
estimated Gaussian distribution. In other words, we would expect that, after all,
the “true” probability for failure f is rather high, i.e., f > f0 or presumably even
f ≫ f0
Let us indeed evaluate the expected probability for a seemingly “normal” (i.e.,
not caused by card etc games) failure. This expected normal probability for failure
is
〈f〉 =
∫ ∞
−∞
1
σ
√
2pi
· f · exp
(
− 1
2σ2
(ln f − ln f0)2
)
d |ln f | (2)
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(we imagine that the miscalculation by including the f > 1 region is negligible, but
one could of course do better if needed).
We immediately write f = e−|ln f |. We had hoped to expect “normal” failure
with the probability given by
〈f〉 =
∫ ∞
−∞
1
σ
√
2pi
· exp
(
− 1
2σ2
(|ln f | − |ln f0|)2 − |ln f |
)
d |ln f |
=
∫ ∞
−∞
1
σ
√
2pi
· exp
(
− 1
2σ2
[(|ln f | − |ln f0|+ σ2)2
−σ4 + 2σ2|ln fo|
])
d |ln f |
= exp
(
σ2
2
− |ln fo|
)
= fo e
σ2/2. (3)
Hence the remarkability or apparent miraculousness of the outcome that LHC
should fail seemingly by a “normal” accident – such as political closure – is not the
“miraculocity” corresponding to the most likely value for f , i.e., −ln fo = |ln fo|,
but rather to “remarkableness′′ = −ln 〈f〉 = |ln 〈f〉| = |ln fo| − σ22 .
It is this correction by the term −σ2
2
that causes less conviction for our model
being true if the failure of LHC shows up as a “normal” failure, than if we get a
failure caused by a card or quantum random number game. One should keep in
mind that whether in our model one or the other reasons for failure occurs depends
largely on the relative sizes of −ln f and −ln p .
In this way, it would be more convincing that our theory were true if the failure
were found by a card game or the like than by a “normal” failure of LHC. It would
thus be profitable scientifically if we could provoke a card game failure instead of
a “normal” one; we would have the possibility of arranging that if our model were
right. In the case of our model being wrong, of course, the card game project would
only add to the totally failure probability of LHC, making a card game a risk and a
bad thing.
Should our theory be right, the failure of LHC would be guaranteed with 2
3
probability, and in that case, the chance of total failure probability would not change
greatly whether we perform a card game project or not. In that case we would just
move some failure probability from the “normal” failure due to the card game or
the similar case.
If we place some economical value on the degree of confidence we would obtain
if our model were indeed true depending on whether one failure or another really
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occurred, we could put this benefit into the form
b1) = c · “remarkableness′′
= c ·
{
|ln p| if game failure
|ln 〈f〉| = |ln fo| − σ22 if “normal′′ failure.
(4)
In the case of our theory being right, which occurs with probability r, we esti-
mated that LHC would be stopped with 2
3
probability [1] so that this benefit will
be calculated as an average,
〈
b1)
〉
= c · “remarkableness′′
= c
〈(
p
f + p
|ln p|+ f
f + p
(
|ln fo| − σ
2
2
))
r
2
3
〉
Gauss
, (5)
where the average 〈· · · 〉Gauss is merely the average over distribution (1) .
For instance, in the limit of a very small probability p assigned to the random
number restricting LHC, we would get
〈
b1)
〉 ≈ c(|ln fo| − σ2
2
)
r · 2
3
+ cp
〈
1
f
〉(
|ln p| − |ln fo|+ σ
2
2
)
r
2
3
+ . . . . (6)
If, on the other hand, we set p≫ 〈f〉, we would get
〈
b1)
〉 ≈
(
|ln p|+ 〈f〉
p
(
|ln fo| − σ
2
2
− |ln p|
))
r · 2
3
. (7)
It is important to notice that, as the previous discussion suggested, the correction
term in (6) will, for small enough p, give increasing benefit with increasing p so that
it would be beneficial w.r.t. this benefit b1) of attaining an increase in the safety of
our knowledge that p is not completely zero in our model.
3.2 Avoiding bad backwardly caused events
In our earlier paper, we included, in our estimates of whether it would pay to
perform our card game or random number game experiment, the consideration that
if we indeed have backward causation for LHC becoming inoperable, then these pre-
arrangements could have side effects that might be bad and, a priori, perhaps also
good. The backward causation effects might end up being huge in much the same
way as the famous forward causation effect of the butterfly in the “butterfly effect”,
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but in the same way as it is difficult to predict whether the effects are good or bad
when the butterfly beats its wings in a particular way, it is hard to know if the pre-
arrangements set up to prevent LHC from working are good or bad. If we think of
such possibilities as the closure of CERN or an earthquake in Geneva, we may judge
it to be bad, but if we think of even earlier or further distant pre-arrangements, it
becomes increasingly difficult to estimate either good or bad. For instance, it is a
possibility that a major factor behind the SSC being terminated by Congress was
the collapse of the Soviet Union [13]. This were a huge backward causation effect
but it is hard to evaluate the probability as to whether it is good or bad. Thus, it
would have been hard to evaluate, in advance, whether our card game would have
been profitable had our theory been known then.
In the previous articles [1], we called the price of the damage arising in excess
when a “normal” failure of LHC is provoked, d .
We should imagine that the very huge backward causation effects occurring very
remotely from the LHC are probably averaged out to zero, similar to the far future
effects of the butterfly wing. Hence the important contributions to the damage cost
d are rather close in time (and space) to the LHC itself. We very roughly estimated,
in our previous study, d ≈ 10· “cost of LHC” ≃ 10 · 3.3 · 109 CHF = 3.3 · 1010 CHF.
In the case of the card game failure, there may also be huge effects, but now
the evaluation of the damage being good or bad would be totally opaque. Only the
effects of performing the actual experiment may have any predictable average effect.
Therefore, in the case of such an artificial failure, the damage would be limited to
statistically washing out damage (i.e., they are equally likely to be good or bad) and
the obvious loss because of the restriction on the d rest.loss card drawn.
We should arrange the latter damage to almost certainly be the minimal one by
assigning mild restrictions to be much more likely outcomes than heavy restrictions.
The damage done, or by switching the sign, the (negative) benefit, is
− b2) = d · 2
3
r · f
f + p
+ d rest.loss ·
(
p
(
1− 2
3
r
)
+
2
3
r · p
f + p
)
, (8)
where we used the notation d rest.loss for the cost of the restrictions.
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4 Conclusion
We have argued that it would be a good idea to perform our earlier proposed
experiment of generating some random numbers – by card drawing or by a quantum
random number generator, or even both ways – and letting them then be decisive
in applying restrictions on the beam energy and/or the luminosity and/or the like.
The main point was that our theory, referred to as “model with an imaginary
part of the action”, is indeed right if LHC is stopped by our proposed game than
if it just failed for some technical or political reason. The reason for it being more
convincing that the stoppage of LHC is due to a random number rather than a
“normal” failure is that it is very hard to estimate in advance how likely it is for a
“normal” failure of LHC to occur.
The greatest encouragement for performing the experiment without much hesi-
tation is the remark that whatever happens with our proposed experiment, it will, in
practice, seem to be a success or at least to be of no harm. The point is that in the
case of any restriction being imposed by the random numbers, we have, because of
the very fact of these random numbers being generated at all, obtained the shocking
great discovery that there is “backward causation.” Such a discovery of the future
influencing the present and past would be monumental. Consequently, we would be
very happy and it would be a fantastic success for the LHC to have caused such a
discovery!
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